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THE NOBEL PRIZE FOR LAW 
Alfred F. Conard* 
There is no Nobel prize for law. This lack is not in itself a 
cause for concern, since the discipline of law is replete with its 
own rewards. But some cause for concern inheres in the implica-
tion that law provides very few examples of the kinds of contri-
butions to humanity that merit Nobel prizes. 
I. Wttv No NOBEL? 
Nobel prizes are awarded to recognize extraordinary contribu-
tions to human welfare or human understanding. Very little that 
is done in the name of law would qualify, and the little that 
might qualify is hard to recognize. 
Contributions that might qualify are hard to recognize be-
cause legal ideas are hard to evaluate before they are put into 
effect. By the time that a creative idea is put into effect, it has 
been reshaped by many minds or hands, and appropriated by 
even more numerous public figures. The genius of the original 
Bardeen1 or Crick2 is obscured by the overlay of revisions by 
others. 
A more fundamental obstacle to awarding a Nobel prize for 
law is the difference between what scientists and artists do for 
humanity and what lawyers do. When a scientist discovers a 
means of making rice fields more productive, he adds to the food 
supply without taking food from anyone. When a poet provides 
us with a new insight, he makes us wiser without making anyone 
more ignorant. 
Law, on the other hand, is largely concerned with taking from 
one person in order to give to another. In this respect it does not 
differ from government or commerce, the former of which ad-
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1. John Bardeen received the Nobel Prize in physics in 1956 for the discovery of the 
transistor effect and in 1972 for development of a theory of superconductivity. 
2. Francis Crick received the Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine in 1962 for the 
discovery of the molecular structure of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). 
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ministers involuntary exchanges while the latter consists of vol-
untary ones. Law, government, and commerce are all essential to 
society, but the positive balance of benefits over costs of some of 
their applications is minuscule or doubtful. 
The uncertainty of net benefit in some of the applications of 
law is particularly conspicuous in the law of torts. According to 
the fantasies of legal theory, tort-feasors are compelled to pay 
damages to tort victims, so that tort victims become richer than 
they were before the transfer, and tort-feasors correspondingly 
poorer. The arithmetic sum is zero, but the money transferred is 
assumed to do more good in the hands of the victim than in the 
hands of the tort-feasor. If the facts corresponded to the fantasy, 
one would have no reason to question the positive balance of 
benefit over cost. 
But the idea that tort law transfers money from tort-feasors to 
tort victims is far from reality. Most of the money received by 
tort victims comes not from tort-feasors but from the general 
public through insurance premiums, and the public pays out 
more than two dollars for every one dollar that gets to a tort 
victim. When the victim who receives the payment is severely 
impoverished, one dollar in his hands is probably more benefi-
cial than two in the hands of premium payers, but the opposite 
is likely to be true when the victim's needs are no more acute 
than those of the average payer of premiums. 
If tort law's expensive transfers have a saving grace, it is their 
deterrent function. If the threat of liability induces a surgeon, 
for example, to use a little more care in counting sponges, it 
spares patients from enormous suffering and expense at very lit-
tle cost to anyone. There must be some such cases, although it is 
far from certain that threats of retribution reduce the incidence 
of unintended errors. Instead of extirpating error, the threat of 
liability is likely to induce expenditures, up to the level of the 
probable damages, on additional personnel and sophisticated in-
struments. Procedures become safer, but consume a larger share 
of available resources. Whether the net effect on aggregate 
health is positive or negative remains conjectural. Whatever the 
balance may be, it is not in a class with the balance that results 
from discovering a more nourishing strain of food grains. 
Because of these inherent characteristics of tort law, the great 
forward leaps in it that enthuse lawyers do not have the same 
appeal to the rest of humanity. Dramatic increases in the sums 
of money that are awarded for mental pain and suffering or for 
asbestos poisoning are presumably beneficial to the recipients, 
but most of the money comes from the pockets of investors and 
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consumers. In the rare case in which liability costs are not 
passed on to investors and consumers, a substantial fraction of 
them falls on taxpayers, since the companies that are held liable 
deduct their payments or ins.urance premiums from their taxa-
ble income. 
If we turn our eyes from torts to the criminal law, large net 
gains for humanity are equally elusive. The most conspicuous 
activity of "justice" in this area is putting people into prison. 
The beneficial aspects of this activity consist partly of disabling 
the offenders (while they are in jail) from committing crimes 
against people who are out of jail, and partly of deterring them 
and their likes from committing future crimes. The direct costs 
are not only the deprivation of convicts' liberty and their depen-
dents' support, but also the price of providing board and room 
to the convicts while they are imprisoned. Incalculable indirect 
costs inhere in the contagion of criminality that is propagated 
among convicts and their families by the prison experience. But 
nonimprisonment and early release seem to offer countervailing 
dangers for the potential victims of crime. The triumphs of law-
yers-whether in putting suspects into prison or in keeping 
them out-often seem like hollow victories for the rest of the 
population. 
Incremental gains are of course possible. Civil and criminal 
law are susceptible of improvement within their basic 
frameworks. Changes can be made that increase benefits a little 
more than they increase costs, although available methods of. 
measurement will render the gains disputable. But hardly any of 
the improvements that are imagined and advocated by jurists 
can be compared in their cost-benefit ratio with a scientific dis-
covery or a work of art. 
II. POTENTIAL WINNERS 
Are great gains with minor costs possible in the area of law 
and justice? Nobel prizes reward two very different kinds of 
gains. One kind is exemplified by the peace prize awarded in 
1978 to Sadat and Begin, and in 1973 to Kissinger and Le Due 
Tho. The prize was for stopping a conflict, with great benefit to 
everyone involved, and negligible losses to anyone. 
The other kind of Nobel prize is awarded for an addition to 
knowledge or insight, in science or in art. It is awarded for 
achievements such as discovering the double helix, or writing the 
Gulag Archipelago. 
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Either kind of prize might be merited in the area of law and 
justice. I will discuss a few possibilities. 
A. Reducing Conff,ict 
Society confronts a number of expensive conflicts, other than 
war, which might be susceptible of resolution by less expensive 
means. At the end of the nineteenth century, disputes between 
employees and employers were commonly waged exclusively by 
deprivation and violence. As a result of labor legislation and 
other developments, weapons of deprivation and violence have 
been partially replaced by peaceful bargaining. If resort to depri-
vation and violence has actually decreased, the resulting amelio-
ration of the costs of struggle may have deserved a Nobel prize. 
A more basic treatment of conflicts between employers and 
employees . may be seen in the European institution of 
codetermination. This is not merely a change of weapons, as in 
collective bargaining under the United States Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act, but the opening of an avenue for agreement 
on common objectives. Another promising institution, which is 
gaining ground in the United States and might lead eventually 
to a coalescence of employer and employee objectives, is em-
ployee stock ownership. All of these developments are imagin-
able Nobel candidates. 
Another example of a big gain for humanity with little cost 
may be the program of "release on own recognizance," which 
was launched by the VERA project in New York. Thousands of 
suspects were saved from imprisonment and from the loss of op-
portunity to earn income pending trial, while the state was 
spared the expense of housing them in prison. One cannot be 
certain of the net gain without knowing how many crimes the 
released ·suspects committed between arraignment and trial, but 
the general appraisal of the program has been favorable. 
A great leap forward in justice may have been achieved in 
New Zealand by abolishing tort claims for personal injury. Medi-
cal costs and wage losses are reimbursed largely by public funds, 
without the expenses of insurance administration and fault 
determination. 
B. Expanding Knowledge 
Major advances in law have occasionally come about through 
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flashes of insight followed by fortuitous waves of public accept-
ance, but similar advances are unlikely to occur frequently until 
there is more knowledge, and more recognition of knowledge, 
about how legal processes work. Thinking about law is con-
stricted by underlying beliefs that are often little better than su-
perstitions. In the area of crime, each of us "knows" in his or her 
own mind that crime would be immensely reduced by increasing 
welfare payments, or by increasing incarceration, or by sani-
tizing television, or by revitalizing religion, but there is no con-
sensus among us, and no scientific basis for a consensus. In the 
area of torts, laymen, lawyers, judges, and professors talk as if 
malpractice damages were paid by negligent physicians, without 
knowing whether physicians sustain significant diminutions of 
their incomes, or manage to shift their liabilities to patients, to 
employers (via health insurance), or to taxpayers (via Medicare 
and Medicaid). In the area of mental injury, theorists advocate 
recovery of damages for invading privacy or for precipitating 
pain wifoout knowing whether such damage suits increase or de-
crease privacy or pain. 
Knowledge about the workings of legal processes is not gained 
by debating the meaning of statutes and constitutions, or even 
by examining their history, although these exercises are useful 
guides to society's evaluation of objectives. Statistics are not 
necessarily any more helpful. Decreases in the number of re-
ported crimes do not necessarily indicate decreases in commit-
ted crimes; neither do decreases in the number of civil rights 
complaints indicate decreases in the number of civil rights 
violations. 
Fortunately, more relevant knowledge is being accumulated. 
Empirical studies are disclosing the effects, or absence of effects, 
of exclusionary rules on the behavior of police officers and prose-
cutors. A few surveys, instead of collating police records, have 
asked ordinary citizens how often they experience assaults, bur-
glaries, arrests, and searches. In the area of malpractice, physi-
cians and hospitals have responded to queries about how mal-
practice liability affects their practices and their financial 
charges. The correlations of automobile accidents with enforce-
ment of drinking-driver laws have been observed in various 
countries. Studies of these kinds bring us closer to discovering 
principles that can be used in framing laws whose net benefits 
are more certain. 
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Ill. PROPAGATING WINNERS 
Scientific knowledge about the effects of laws on human be-
havior is not plentiful. It seldom appears in traditional law re-
views, and is encountered more frequently in journals devoted to 
socio-legal research, like the Law and Society Review, the Amer-
ican Bar Foundation Research Journal, and the Journal of Le-
gal Studies. It is not generated principally in law schools, but in 
departments of sociology and economics. This provenance prob-
ably results from two differences between the study of law and 
the study of social sciences. Law professors tend to think about 
what should be penalized and what rewarded, and to derive 
their information on the subject from constitutions, statutes, 
and judicial decisions. Social scientists tend to think about 
causes and effects in human behavior, and are trained in collect-
ing data and deriving correlations between what people do and 
the influences bearing upon them. This way of thinking about 
the legal system is likely to precede creative developments in it. 
The optimal organization of the pursuit of scientific knowl-
edge about the legal system remains to be discovered. I will ven-
ture here a few tentative thoughts about it. The current concen-
tration of empirical observation in departments of social science 
has the advantage of associating the investigators with col-
leagues who are oriented toward scientific methods of thought 
and analysis. It has the disadvantages of dispersing the investi-
gators among different departments and of separating them 
from law teachers. Law teachers have, notwithstanding their 
doctrinal orientation, a considerable acquaintance with the reali-
ties of the legal system, which could illuminate the investiga-
tions made by social scientists. Besides, law teachers and law 
schools would be enriched by closer contacts with scientific in-
vestigations of the system whose doctrines they expound. If sci-
entific study of the legal system continues to develop principally 
outside of law schools, law schools will become more and more 
separated from the frontiers of knowledge about their own field 
of learning. 
Law faculties differ as to whether they want the scientific 
study of legal processes to be carried on in close association with 
the study of positive law or whether they want to let it develop 
in other settings. Those who favor a close association confront a 
puzzle about how to achieve it. 
One approach consists of substituting social science courses 
for law courses in the standard curriculum. This suggestion re-
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ceives aid and comfort from reductionists who believe that law 
students learn in their first year all the law that matters. Advo-
cates of this solution underestimate, in my view, the difference 
between what a lawyer needs to know in order to play the games 
of which the practice largely consists and what a lawyer needs to 
know in order to reform the legal system. The difference is 
something like that between what a military officer needs to 
know in order to win battles and what a diplomat needs to know 
in order to negotiate treaties. Peace may be promoted by edu-
cating peace makers, but it is unlikely to be advanced by aban-
doning the education of soldiers. The wasteful ways of the legal 
system will not be reduced by suspending formal education in 
the gambits by which the existing games are played. 
The study of how the legal system operates is very different 
from the study of what the legal rules are. Although the two 
should be on speaking terms, they are not interchangeable. The 
scientific study of the legal system calls for a program that is 
distinguishable from that of practitioner training, and bears a 
name of its own. It might be described as the "laws of law," 
meaning the scientific laws (like the laws of chemistry, physics 
and physiology) that govern the operation of society's laws (like 
civil and criminal codes). If it were to be christened in the aca-
demic tradition of Greek and Latin roots, it might be called 
nomonomics, nomology, jurology or juridics. For the nonce, I will 
call it juridical science. 
Curricula in juridical science will start out on a modest scale 
because, among other reasons, there is no established demand 
for doctors of juridical science. Initially, these curricula may 
consist of traditional law courses mingled with experience in re-
search on projects sponsored by grants from foundations or gov-
ernment agencies. A few brave candidates will choose to study in 
these curricula, as they have done in other nascent scientific en-
deavors, even though their opportunities for future employment 
are obscure. Some of the graduates will be hired as assistants to 
legislators and government executives. Law firms whose practice 
involves legislative and administrative advocacy-like those that 
make up Washington's "other government"-may seed their 
practitioner staffs with juridical scientists. A few of the juridical 
science courses will probably be useful to future practitioners, 
especially those that illuminate the evaluation of scientific and 
pseudoscientific evidence. 
Although the curriculum in juridical science will not prepare a 
student very well for the private practice of law, I see no need 
for giving its graduates a different degree. "Juris doctor" seems 
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to befit a juridical scientist at least as well as it befits a practi-
tioner. Juridical science may be regarded as a department of the 
law school that leads to the same degree with a different "ma-
jor," alongside a major in legal practice or various majors in ar-
eas of practice, such as private law and public law. As in other 
departmentalized schools, diplomas and transcripts could dis-
close the area of the graduate's concentration, so that bar exam-
iners and employers could draw such distinctions as they wish 
among graduates of different curricula. 
Other and better arrangements for the propagation of juridical 
science can probably be imagined. The hospitality of its environ-
ment will affect the rate of its maturation, but the science will 
survive and multiply in some form. Juridical scientists may win 
no Nobel prizes, but some juridical scientists will deserve them. 
